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Abstract Climate change is an important environmental problem and one whose
economic implications are many and varied. This paper starts with the presumption
that mitigation of greenhouse gases is a necessary policy that has to be designed in a
cost effective way. It is well known that market instruments are the best option for cost
effectiveness. But the discussion regarding which of the various market instruments
should be used, how they may interact and what combinations of policies should be
implemented is still open and very lively. In this paper we propose a combination of
instruments: the marketable emission permits already in place in Europe for major
economic sectors and a CO2 tax for economic sectors not included in the emissions
permit scheme. The study uses an applied general equilibrium model for the Spanish
economy to compute the results obtained with the new mix of instruments proposed.
As the combination of the market for emission permits and the CO2 tax admits differ-
ent possibilities that depend on how the mitigation is distributed among the economic
sectors, we concentrate on four possibilities: cost-effective, equalitarian, proportional
to emissions, and proportional to output distributions. Other alternatives to the CO2 tax
are also analysed (tax on energy, on oil and on electricity). Our findings suggest that
careful, well designed policies are needed as any deviation imposes significant addi-
tional costs that increase more than proportionally to the level of emissions reduction
targeted by the EU.
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1 Introduction
Climate change (CC) is an important environmental problem. Its economic implica-
tions are many and varied. There is general agreement among economists that CC
caused by anthropogenic actions can be modelled either as a public good (bad) of
transnational scope or as a negative external effect (at world level) caused by the emis-
sion into the atmosphere of greenhouse gases (GHG). There is also agreement that (i)
there are major scientific and economic uncertainties; (ii) the costs of controlling GHG
will be borne in the present while benefits will accrue in future decades; and (iii) this
kind of complexity raises a unique mix of problems. Many papers have focused on the
economics of CC. Kolstad and Toman (2005), Stern (2008) and Nordhaus (2008) are
good reviews of this literature. Microeconomic theory (Aldy et al. 2009; Tirole 2010),
game theory (Uzawa 2003; Alesina and Passarelli 2010; Hoel 1990), macroeconomic
models and many quantitative techniques (Weyant 1999; Springer 2003) also play
important roles in the economics of CC.
Climate policy has become a hot topic. In the case of Europe, the European Union
(EU) announced a Climate and Energy package with the following targets for 2020:
reduce GHG emissions by 20% with respect to 1990,1 reduce energy consumption by
20% through energy efficiency (EE) measures, and increase renewable energy produc-
tion to 20%.2 This so called 20-20-20 package is based on three main specific policies:
(1) a renewable energy policy;3 (2) an improved CO2 emission trading scheme (EU
ETS);4 and (3) an ‘Effort Sharing Decision’ for emissions from sectors not covered by
the EU ETS (referred to from now on as non-ETS sectors), such as transport, housing,
agriculture and waste (Gallastegui and Galarraga 2010).
Of the main market instruments used to date the trading scheme is the most impor-
tant. After an initial trial period (2005–2007) and with the lessons learnt during the
ongoing 2008–2012 period, the new “market permit” scheme contains several changes
that could significantly improve the economic efficiency of the system.5 But the
1 With the possibility of this target being raised to 30% if other developed countries agree on ambitious
targets.
2 Including a target of 10% renewable energy in the transport sector. This additionally includes deci-
sive support for carbon capture and storage (CCS) technologies included under the general heading of
Geo-engineering solutions.
3 Supported by the Directive (2009/28/EC).
4 Backed up by the “new” Directive (2009/29/EC). The EU ETS covers mainly power stations and other
combustion plants, oil refineries, coke ovens, iron and steel plants and factories making cement, glass, lime,
bricks, ceramics, pulp and paper and cardboard. The aviation sector is also to be included.
5 They include increasing auctioning (100% by 2013 for the electricity sector, and for the rest 20% by
2013, 70% by 2020 and 100% by 2027), the use of a sectoral approach for the distribution of rights by
the European Commission (eliminating allocation by Member States through National Allocation Plans) and
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European Commission6 has also established binding targets for the efforts required
of each Member State in sectors not regulated by the EU ETS. In the case of Spain,
the target is a 10% reduction on 2005 levels.7 Member States have some freedom to
decide how these targets will be met. This is thus an excellent opportunity to discuss
what instruments could be used to achieve these objectives, how they may interact and
what combinations of policy instruments could be implemented.
The research community has been putting great effort into designing effective pol-
icy instruments for environmental policy. The literature on the choice of market-based
instruments versus command and control instruments is mature and well developed
(Weitzman 1974; Baumol and Oates 1988; Hahn 1989, 2000; Tietenberg 1990; and
others). In the economics literature it is also quite clear what a “cost effective policy
instrument” means: it is one which is capable of attaining the desired environmental
target level at the minimum cost. In the case of mitigation policies, cost effectiveness
implies that all economic agents must pay the same price, at the margin, for their
emissions (Baumol and Oates 1971). Additionally, it is well established that when
markets are perfect emission trading permits and a CO2 tax that covers all sources of
emissions can both achieve the reductions at minimum cost (Weitzman op cit). Parry
and Pizer (2007) show that the main issue is not the choice of instrument per se but
rather how instruments are designed, given that under certain conditions both instru-
ments can be designed to achieve similar outcomes. Other papers such as Hauser et al.
(2008) and Hourcade et al. (2008) deal with how both instruments can harm compet-
itiveness, while Green et al. (2007) highlights that carbon taxes can help to eliminate
other distortionary taxes. There is also a considerable body of literature that discusses
policy instruments in terms of cost effectiveness and dynamic efficiency (Goulder
et al. 1999; Hoel and Karp 2002). But beneath this general agreement there are many
specific questions in which no consensus has yet emerged. For instance, work has
been done at the theoretical and empirical levels on the analysis of different evalua-
tion criteria for instruments (Goulder and Parry 2008) and also on the possible effects
of combining different types of policies, either horizontally (in the same jurisdiction)
or in different jurisdictions (Goulder and Stavins 2010).
In fact, one could argue that the combination of instruments is the most sensible
way to simultaneously achieve different policy goals. This is especially true in the case
of GHG emissions (where there are multiple emission sources) if ambitious targets are
to be met at reasonable cost (OECD 2009).8 On this respect, Ansuategi and Galarraga
(2009) review the literature on carbon taxes versus carbon trading and propose a com-
bination of the two instruments in a hybrid system, in line with the recommendation
by Newell and Stavins (2003). Several authors have dealt with interactions between
Footnote 5 continued
an increase in the number of economic sectors and GHGs included in the scheme. The number of distorting
elements in the policy designed is greatly reduced.
6 COD (2008).
7 As a consequence, an additional reduction of 25 million tons of GHG emissions is required.
8 Furthermore, the OECD highlights that “[. . .] carbon taxes or emissions trading schemes turn out to
be more effective and comprehensive than other policy tools. However, their cost-effectiveness could be
enhanced by complementing them with other instruments to create a mixed climate policy package”.
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EU ETS and national policies (Del Río 2009; Boots 2003; Sijm 2005; Sijm 2003;
Morthorst 2003).
Finally, in the case of Spain, Del Río (op cit; 2008), Del Río et al. (2009), Linares
et al. (2008) look specifically at the interaction of policies, while González-Eguino
(2010) deals with the economic impact of CO2 mitigation and Labandeira and
Rodríguez (2007) consider distributional issues. Other interesting pieces of research
include Manresa and Sancho (2005) for environmental tax reforms.
This paper fits into the context of the new European climate policy explained ear-
lier, and more specifically into the setting up of national targets for non-ETS sectors
(the “Effort Sharing Decision”). In particular, the work presented here computes the
mitigation costs of a new policy mix: the combination of carbon trading (EU ETS) and
a CO2 tax for non-ETS sectors. Other tax options are also considered. The specific
issues analysed are: (1) what are the impacts of different distribution of mitigation
efforts between ETS and non-ETS sectors?; and (2) for the latter what are the impli-
cations of using energy, oil and electricity taxes besides the CO2 tax? The study uses
an applied general equilibrium (AGE) model for the Spanish economy.9 To the best
of our knowledge, the effects of this policy mix have not been computed to date for
any European economy.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: Sect. 2 presents the scenarios proposed;
Sect. 3 presents the AGE model and Sect. 4 presents the results. The conclusions and
some ideas on further research are given in Sect. 5.
2 Scenarios
For the first issue, that is, the impacts of different distribution of mitigation efforts
between ETS and non-ETS sectors, the following four different effort sharing distri-
butions are considered:
1. Cost-effective Distribution (CED): CED defined as a distribution in which emis-
sion reductions are obtained in sectors where marginal costs of abatement are lower
and marginal costs of abatement are equalised among sectors. In this case, in the
context of an AGE model, a market for tradable emission permits or a tax on CO2
for all emission sources will produce the same resource allocation. Note that in
this scenario shares are not exogenously imposed but are obtained endogenously
by the model.
2. Equalitarian Distribution (ED): This scenario analyses a situation in which half
of the mitigation target is met by ETS sectors and the other half by non-ETS ones.
3. Proportional Emission Distribution (PED): The effort is distributed according
to the share of real emissions between ETS and non-ETS sectors in a baseline year.
In our data base emissions in the ETS sector account for 44% of the total.
4. Proportional Output Distribution (POD): The effort is distributed according to
the share of national output accounted for by each sector in a baseline year. In our
case ETS represents only 10% of national output.
9 Böhringer and Rosendahl (2010) argue that AGE models are the most appropriate models to quantify
the impacts and interactions of different policy instruments.
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These share rules are very common and have been applied (or at least defended) in
many different policy contexts by different groups, sectors or countries. For exam-
ple, all these rules have been suggested or applied in climate policy when designing
National Allocations Plans (see for example: Sijm 2007 or Arto et al. 2009) or also in
other context such as fisheries, when sharing the total allowable catch (TAC) among
countries (see for example: Gallastegui et al. 2002).
For the second issue, the paper explores the possibility of not taxing CO2 emissions
directly but rather taxing actions close to emissions because of the diffuse, shifting
nature of many sources and sectors (services, residential, transport). In fact, after the
political and administrative process takes place, taxes are usually very different from
what is recommended in textbooks10 (Pearce 2006). The following tax options are
analysed for non-ETS sectors, assuming that ETS sectors continue to be covered by
the EU ETS and that the share of the burden achieved is cost effective (i.e. the one
suggested by the CED scenario):
1. Energy Tax : This is a tax on consumption of coal, refined oil and gas from non-ETS
sources (including consumers). It does not take into account the different carbon
contents of each fossil fuel, so the rate is the same for all three.
2. Oil Tax: This is a tax on consumption of refined oil from non-ETS sources (includ-
ing consumers).
3. Electricity Tax : This is a tax on consumption of electricity from non-ETS sources
(including consumers). Although electricity consumption does not directly emit
CO2, its production is fossil-fuel intensive, and accounts for 22.7% of total CO2
emissions. A reduction in consumption of electricity in non-ETS will indirectly
reduce emissions.
Of course, there are many other possibilities that could be analysed such as a tax on
coal or on natural gas. These instruments however only attain very small reductions
in emissions if imposed in non-ETS sectors, so they have not been considered.
3 The model
To estimate the mitigation costs of the different climate policy designs we use a static
version of an AGE model (see Appendix for notation). These models are empiri-
cal versions of a Walrasian model which enable interdependencies between different
economic agents to be taken into consideration (Shoven and Whalley 1992). They are
useful for analysing policies such as climate policies, which generate significant direct
and indirect impacts.
The tradable emission market is simulated following Dellink et al. (2004) approach.
The government sets the number of permits for each period and allows them to be
traded freely on the market. Permits are, thus, modeled as a production factor (linked
directly to CO2 emissions) whose price is determined in equilibrium (the number of
permits decided by the authority determines its supply). Sectors have to pay for all
10 In fact, Pearce shows in this study that the UK Climate Change Levy generates an “implicit carbon
tax” in which natural gas, which has the lowest carbon content, has the highest tax rate. This paradoxically
generates an incentive to replace gas by coal.
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the permits used the market price. In contrast, the tax simulation process is based on
an iterative process in which taxes are increased gradually until the desired level of
emission reductions is achieved. The revenue obtained with any of the instruments
included in the simulations (taxes or permit market with) is channeled to representa-
tive consumers via transfers (i.e. an equal yield tax reforms) so government expending
remains constant (see Sect. 3.6). For the sake of simplicity, this paper assumes that
all reductions have to be achieved mainly though these two policies, that is, no other
related policies are considered. Specifically, this means that no additional emission
permits can be bought outside the EU borders.
Three classes of conditions have to be fulfilled in a competitive equilibrium: zero
profit conditions, market clearance conditions and income balance conditions. Equilib-
rium is characterised by a set of equilibrium prices such that demand equals supply for
all commodities simultaneously (market clearance condition). In this situation agents
cannot do better by altering their behaviour. Differentiating the profit and utility func-
tions with respect to input and output prices provides compensated demand and supply
coefficients (Shephard’s lemma), which appear subsequently in the market clearance
conditions. For the sake of simplicity, and as it is usual in this field, we do not write
down the explicit functional forms but instead use the acronyms: LT (Leontief); CD
(Cobb-Douglas), CES (Constant Elasticity of Substitution) and CET (Constant Elas-
ticity of Transformation) to indicate the class of functional form in place. For more
explanations about this type presentation of AGE models see Dellink et al. (2004) or
Faehn et al. (2009).
The model comprises (1) 22 production sectors; (2) a representative consumer; (3) a
government which collects taxes, supplies goods and services and controls CO2 emis-
sions through the different instruments proposed; and (4) the “Rest of the World”,
an aggregate that brings together the foreign sector. Production sectors are broken
down into energy sectors (coal, oil, gas and electricity), major emitters (industry and
transport) and other sectors with major economic weight (public and private services).
3.1 Producers
Each production sector j = 1, . . . J produces a homogenous good with a technology
characterised by nested CES functions. The output of each sector (Yi ) is obtained by
combining the intermediate inputs (Y I D1, j ) capital (K j ) and labour (L j ). Equation 1
11
shows a simplified form of this output function, and Fig. 1 depicts its structure in
graphic form. The sigma parameters (σ ) of the function represent the elasticities of
substitution between different inputs (see Appendices). Finally, when a CO2 market
instrument is simulated permits should also be included in the function (E Pj ) as another
production factor that is needed. It is directly linked with a specific coefficient (with
11 Equation 1 depicts these functions in a shortened form, via inputs and elasticities. For instance, a CES
function for a case with two levels of nesting and two inputs takes the following form: on the first level: Y =
C E S(X1, X2; σ) = (a1 Xσ−1/σ1 + a2 Xσ−1/σ2 )σ/σ−1 and on the second level: X2 = C E S(X3, X4;ψ) =
(a3 X
ψ−1/ψ
3 + a4 Xψ−1/ψ4 )ψ/ψ−1, where a1,a2, a3, a4 are parameters and σ,ψ represent the elasticities
of substitutions between the inputs. By substituting X2 in function Y we can envisage the length of the
output functions proposed.
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Fig. 1 Output function structure. Source Babiker et al. (2001)
Leontief function) to the consumption of coal, oil and gas (Y I De, j ).
Y j = C E S
(
Y I D1, j , . . . , Y
I D




, ∀ j ∈ (1, . . . , J) (1)
Producers maximise profit, subject to the technological constraints. At equilibrium,
net profit after tax would be zero, i.e. the value of the output from each sector would
be the same as the sum total value of the inputs. This condition is reflected in Eq. 2,
where Pj is the price of the output from sector j, PK is the price of capital and PL is
the price of labour. τ Kj and τ
L
j are the sectoral tax rates on capital and labour. Finally,
when a CO2 instrument is implemented (with a CO2 emission permit market or a
CO2 price) the producer has to pay (directly or indirectly) a market price (PE ) for
every unit of permit/emissions used or (E Pj ). However, when a non-CO2 tax instru-
ment is implemented the producer has to pay a tax (τ T∗ ) on the consumption of the
specific energy-related inputs selected for taxation (Y I D∗, j , where * can refers to coal,














PL + τ Lj
)
L j + PE E Pj
= Yi Pj , ∀ j ∈ (1, . . . , J) (2)
3.2 Consumers
The model considers a representative consumer, who owns the production factors. Con-
sumer preferences are defined by a utility function from among the various consumer
goods j and their corresponding elasticities of substitution (see Eq. 3 and Fig. 2).
U = C E S (C1, . . . , CJ : σ) (3)
The consumer maximises his total utility (U) subject to his budgetary constraints.
As shown in Eq. 4, the income obtained from labour, capital and direct transfers
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Fig. 2 Utility function structure. Source Babiker et al. (2001)
from the government (T ) is equal to consumption (C j ), tax payments associated with
consumption (τCj ) and savings (S). The savings of the representative consumer (see
Sect. 3.7) are what enable investments and the foreign trade deficit to be financed.






· C j + S (4)
3.3 The government
The government obtains its income through taxes on capital, labour and consumption.
That income enables it to provide public goods and services G j and make direct trans-
fers to consumers (T ). The preferences of the government are modelled via a Leontief
function that enables the structure of public spending to be considered as fixed (see
Eq. 5).









Pj · G¯ j + T (6)
The additional income collected by the government from CO2 market or taxes is
transferred directly (T ) to consumers, so that the level of public spending remains
constant (see Eq. 6). In the case of the CO2 market instrument this extra income will
be determined by multiplying all the permits by the market price
(∑J
j=1 PE E Pj
)
. In
the case of the tax instrument, it will be determined by multiplying CO2 or specific
energy-related inputs by the tax
(∑J
j=1 τ T∗ Y I D∗, j
)
3.4 The foreign sector
To reflect trade with surrounding areas, we group all other countries into a single
aggregate item referred to as the “Rest of the World”. Out of all the flows that exist,
we consider imports and exports of goods and services.
Two assumptions habitually made in AGEs are used here. The first is the small
economy assumption, which establishes that (a) the domestic economy is too small
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to influence world-wide prices; and (b) import and export requirements can be met
by trade with the Rest of the World. The second is the Armington assumption, which
assumes that domestic and imported/exported goods are imperfect substitutes. In prac-
tice, this means modelling total supply (Y T Sj ) as a CES function (see Eq. 7) which
aggregates domestic output (Y j ) and imports (M j ); and total demand (Y T Dj ), equal
to total supply, by means of a transformation function or CET function (see Eq. 8),
which breaks down that aggregate into domestic demand (Y Dj ) and exports (X j ).
Y T Sj = C E S
(
Y j ; M j
)
, ∀ j ∈ (1, . . . , J) (7)
Y T Dj = Y T Sj = C E S
(
Y j ; X j
)
, ∀ j ∈ (1, . . . , J) (8)
Finally, as a “closure rule” (see Eq. 9), we assume that the trade deficit (X D), i.e.





M j − X j
) = X D (9)
3.5 CO2 emissions
CO2 emissions are calculated by using coefficients (αe, λe) applied to consumption
of coal, oil and gas. The representative consumer also generates emissions (heating,
gasoline and diesel, etc.) so the total emissions (E) are the sum of the emissions from
the production sectors j (E P ) and those of the representative consumer (EC )





αe · Y I De, j +
3∑
e=1
λe · Ce (10)
The potential for emission reduction is limited, because burning fossil fuels inevi-
tably generates CO2. However, in the context of this model, emissions can be reduced
in an induced fashion. When emissions are limited the relative prices of the factors
vary, resulting in changes (i) in the energy mix, with CO2 intensive fossil fuels being
replaced by less intensive fuels; (ii) in the output and utility functions, with energy
use being replaced by other inputs; and (iii) in the economic structure, with patterns
of consumption shifting towards low-carbon products and services. Finally, once all
the possibilities of substitution have been exploited, the alternative that remains is to
reduce the output in some sectors.
3.6 Supply of capital and labour
The total supply of labour is considered to be exogenous. However, it is important to
specify investment and capital flows: the level of investment in an economy depends on
interest rates, on the capital stock and on depreciation. These points cannot be incor-
porated into a static context, so we assume that the initial capital stock is adjusted
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over the years of the simulation in line with the following condition: the price of
investment (PI ) in equilibrium must be equal to the price of capital (PK ). In this way
(Hayashi 1982), investment decisions are at least consistent with the return required
by capital.
3.7 Equilibrium and solution
The conventional Walrasian concept of equilibrium is used: the quantities supplied
are equal to the quantities demanded, prices act as adjustment variables and all agents
comply with their optimisation plans. In our case, that means equilibrium in the goods
and services markets (Eq. 11), in the labour and capital markets (Eqs. 12 and 13) and
between savings and investment (Eq. 14). In the case of instruments that use a tradable
emission permit market there is also equilibrium between the permits supply by the





Y I Dj, j j
]
+ C j + G j + I j +
(
M j − X j
)
, ∀ j ∈ (1, . . . , J) (11)
J∑
j=1
L j = L¯ (12)
J∑
j=1




Pj · I j + X D (14)
E¯ = E ET S (15)
Finding equilibrium solutions requires solving a system of non-linear equations.
The model is programmed using GAMS/MPSGE and resolved with the PATH algo-
rithm.
3.8 Calibration and data
The initial equilibrium data come from an SAM drawn up by integrating12 the data
from the Symmetric Input Output Table (INE 2002, see Table A1) and the data from
sectoral energy balance sheets (Eurostat 2005). The integration of these two tables
reveals the underlying energy flows in the IOT, so that CO2 emissions can then be
12 Energy data are integrated by introducing new rows into the IO Table for demand for energy goods
(crude oil, coal, Oil, gas and electricity) originating from the multiplication of the physical data and prices
for energy balance sheets using the procedure described in Rutherford and Paltsev (2000).
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calculated.13 The reaction of agents to changes is reflected through elasticities of
substitution (Babiker et al. 2001; see Table A2) and emissions are calculated via the
standard coefficients14 for coal, oil and gas.
4 Results
This section presents the results for the different scenarios presented in Sect. 2. To
analyse the different performances, each scenario simulates and compares identical
reductions in CO2 emissions. We discuss the results obtained from analysing different
ways of implementing a given reduction of emissions from 5 to 40%. In the first place,
the differences in implementation refer to the use of different criteria for distributing
the burden of the emission target between ETS and non-ETS sectors. Secondly, we
discuss the impacts of using different types of tax in non-ETS sectors, assuming that
the effort share supported by each subset of sectors is that which results from the CED
(i.e. the cost-effective) scenario.
4.1 General results for different emission reductions in ETS and non-ETS sectors
Figure 3 shows the link between CO2 reduction and gross domestic product (GDP)
for the various scenarios listed in Sect. 2. It comes as no surprise that the cost of
emission reductions in terms of GDP differs substantially depending on how the pol-
icy is designed. Different outcomes are obtained when mitigation efforts are shared
differently between ETS and non-ETS sectors. Our quantitative results show that the
relationship between emission reductions and reductions in GDP is convex, i.e. the cost
of reduction increases more than proportionally as the level of reductions increases.
This effect is a consequence of the fact that the best mitigation options are usually
used first and when the level of emission reductions increases these best mitigation
options are exhausted.
The CED scenario is the benchmark option as it achieves the target at minimum
cost. It could be denoted as the “most suitable option” in this second best context.
Note that although some of the scenarios are very close to the CED in terms of costs
for low levels of CO2 reduction, the differences increase (in a non linear way) when
the reduction of emissions increases. For example, with a 20% reduction in emissions
the macroeconomic impacts of the CED, ED and POD scenarios are very similar,
and GDP losses are 0.35, 0.43 and 0.46% respectively. But with a 40% reduction
in emissions the differences increase considerably to 1.07, 1.2 and 3.06%. As more
mitigation effort is made the differences between methods increase and which of the
options considered in this paper is chosen becomes a crucial factor.
13 The database used to draw up the SAM is the symmetric IO Table of the INE (Spanish National Statis-
tics Office), so the data are valued at basic prices. Tax on consumption includes VAT and the tax on labour
includes social security contributions payable by workers. All remaining taxes are grouped under tax on
capital.
14 As SAM cannot distinguish between quantities and prices, so different emission coefficients are assumed
that reflects the difference in prices paid by consumers and producers for energy products. However, the
physical emission coefficients used are the standard used by Eurostat (2005): tonnes of CO2 per Ktoe for
coal (4.104), oil (2.851) and gas (2.187).
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Fig. 3 Total CO2 emission reduction and costs for different scenarios
Table 1 Cost-effective share-out of reduction effort
5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 35% 40% 45% 50%
ETS 0.71 0.70 0.69 0.68 0.66 0.65 0.63 0.62 0.60 0.59
Non ETS 0.29 0.30 0.31 0.32 0.34 0.35 0.37 0.38 0.40 0.41
It is also worth comparing the ED and PED scenarios. Both generate aggregate
impacts that are not far from the CED. To understand why this happens, consider the
cost-effective share, implicitly obtained from the CED scenario (see Table 1). This
table shows how the reductions are shared between ETS sectors and non-ETS when
mitigation is achieved cost-effectively. Note that for low emission reduction targets
ETS sectors should make around 71% of the total effort but when targets are higher and
the cheapest abatement options for ETS sectors are exhausted, their share gradually
drops to 59%. In the ED scenario the share of ETS is 50% and constant, while in POD
it is 45%. Therefore, we can conclude that ED is always a better choice than PED as
cheaper abatement options are available when the ED scenario is used.
In other words it can be noted that in the ED scenario there are two important
differences: first the magnitude of the shares between ETS and non-ETS sector is
larger and second, these magnitudes remain constant independently of the level of
effort made in emission reduction. Aggregate costs, as expected, are greater than in
the CED scenario and the difference between the two alternatives slowly increases
with the level of reduction effort. That is, deviations from the cost-effective way of
implementing emission reductions are not only costly but increase with the level of
effort. The same conclusion holds in the PED scenario.
Finally, in the POD scenario the cost of cutting emissions proves extremely high.
If the emission reduction targets were distributed according to each sector’s contri-
bution to output the cost would rocket, as the drop in GDP would be 0.78% for a
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Table 2 CO2 emission permit price and tax on CO2 (e/tCO2) for different scenarios
5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 35% 40% 45% 50%
CED 2.1 4.5 7.5 11.0 15.2 20.3 26.6 34.5 44.3 56.8
ED
ETS 1.3 2.8 4.6 6.7 9.1 12.0 15.6 20.0 25.5 32.7
Non ETS 4.0 8.5 13.8 19.9 27.0 35.4 45.2 56.9 70.9 87.8
POD
ETS 0.1 0.2 0.5 0.8 1.0 1.2 1.5 1.7 2.0 2.3
Non ETS 7.8 18.0 31.4 49.3 74.1 109.1 161.1 243.4 386.7 680.1
PED
ETS 1.1 2.4 3.8 5.5 7.4 9.5 12.1 15.1 18.7 23.2
Non ETS 4.5 9.7 15.9 23.3 32.0 42.5 55.2 70.8 90.0 114.2
20% cut in emissions and 3.06% for a 40% cut. The explanation again depends on
the same rationale. The cheapest mitigation options would have to be ruled out as
the effort (share) assigned to ETS sectors is very low. Furthermore, the industries
affected (mainly transport and services) have major indirect impacts which feed back
negatively into the economy as a whole.
Another way of analysing the cost of emission reduction is by looking at the prices
for CO2 in each scenario. Table 2 shows the CO2 prices (in the form of a price for
emission permits or in the form of a tax on CO2) that are needed to achieve the reduc-
tion target in each scenario. In the CED scenario the minimum price needed to achieve
a reduction in emissions in the interval 5 to 50% ranges from 2.1e to 56.8e/tCO2.
A comparison of the prices obtained in the ED and PED scenarios with those obtained
using CED reveals that prices for emission permits are always too low for ETS sectors
and too high for non-ETS. The explanation is obvious: the distribution of emission
reductions between the two blocks is not cost-effective (Table 1). When the POD sce-
nario is used the equilibrium price in the CO2 market is very low (below 2 e/tCO2)
as the emission targets for ETS sectors are very limited, but the price (tax) on CO2 in
non-ETS sectors would need to increase to 74.9e/tCO2 for a 25% target and to 243.4
e/tCO2 for a 40% target. These prices are not only the highest of the four scenarios
considered but also extremely high per se.
Finally, Table 3 shows the general results for a reduction of 30% (the level that the
EU could achieve by 2020) in CO2 emissions when the figures are broken down accord-
ing to different perspectives (general, by sectors and energy-related). As can be seen
from the bottom part of the table, a 30% overall reduction in emissions requires dif-
ferent reductions from ETS and non-ETS sectors depending on the scenarios selected.
Furthermore, the results show that variables such as utility, GDP, consumption and
investment fall, whatever policy design is used. Utility drops by 0.5% in the CED sce-
nario and by an interval of between 0.6 and 1.6% in the others. In this model, utility
is the best indicator for the loss of welfare, but it must be stressed that the model does
not take into account future benefits of mitigation policies and that the utility function
does not incorporate the environmental quality variable as an argument.15
15 Recent literature on the appropriate discount rate uses a utility function in which not only consumption
but also environmental goods matter (Gollier 2010).
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Table 3 General impacts of a 30% reduction in total CO2 emissions for scenarios (%)
CED ED POD PED
General (%)
Utility −0.5 −0.6 −1.6 −0.7
GDP −0.6 −0.8 −1.6 −0.8
Private consumption −0.5 −0.5 −1.2 −0.6
Investment −1.2 −1.4 −2.5 −1.5
Sectoral output (%)
Agriculture −1.3 −1.6 −3.3 −1.8
Industry −2.1 −2.4 −3.8 −2.5
Transport −1.1 −1.2 −2.1 −1.3
Services −0.7 −0.8 −1.4 −0.8
Energy consumption (%)
Coal −55.6 −45.0 −9.5 −40.4
Oil −18.7 −23.2 −37.6 −25.0
Gas −16.9 −18.0 −26.0 −18.7
Electricity −7.4 −6.9 −6.6 −6.8
Emissions (%)
Total emissions −30.0 −30.0 −30.0 −30.0
Emissions ETS −43.9 −33.9 −7.0 −30.0
Emissions NO-ETS −19.0 −26.9 −48.5 −30.0
The drop in GDP for a 30% reduction in CO2 emissions ranges from 0.6 to 1.6%.
This reflects falling trends in consumption and investment since public spending and
the foreign trade deficit are constant. The fall in investment is due to lower returns
originated by a drop in the prices of capital and labour relative to energy prices (and
CO2 prices). Note also that although the drop in GDP is greater than the drop in utility,
in this static model it is not possible to reflect how future economic growth will be
affected by lower levels of investment.
Table 3 also reveals the effects on the economic structure, with the data aggre-
gated under Agriculture, Industry, Transport and Services. The results show a shift of
activity, for all scenarios, towards the Service sector. That shift is most pronounced
for the distribution with the biggest overall impact (POD). This is a consequence of
the way in which the possibilities of substitution in the output and utility functions
are modelled. The service sector has a lower impact given that its economic activity
is less CO2 intensive. Moreover, its economic weight is enormous (accounting for
65% of consumption and 45% of output) and hence the general reduction in the other
macroeconomic variables is partly offset.
Other outcomes that highlight differences between scenarios are the respective
impacts on energy consumption. For example, the CED scenario induces a change
that is to some extent proportional to the carbon content of each fuel used for energy:
coal consumption is reduced by 55.6%, oil by 18.7%, gas by 16.9% and electricity
by 7.4%. As we move away from this “ideal” scenario of variation in the energy
mix the cost of reducing emissions increases. Hence the energy mix resulting from
the POD distribution explains why this policy alternative is so expensive: the drop
in the consumption of coal (the “dirtiest” fuel) is just 9.5%, and the burden of achiev-
ing the emission reduction is shifted onto oil (37.6%) and gas (26%).
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Fig. 4 Mitigation costs for different scenarios in non-ETS sectors
4.2 General results for different taxes on non-ETS sectors
In this sub-section we consider how the cost of achieving targets would change if a tax
on energy, oil or electricity were used instead of a carbon tax in non-ETS sectors. As
argued above, this change in “taxable income” is quite usual due to information and
political difficulties in the real world (Pearce op cit).16 Note that now the non-ETS
sectors will be taxed on something other than their level of carbon use, which could
lead to quantifiable cost differences in meeting the targets established.
Figure 4 shows the results for the different scenarios compared to the CED scenario.
It is clear that when the extent by which CO2 emission taxes are replaced by other
related taxes increases, mitigation costs also increase. For a total reduction in CO2 of
30%, GDP drops by 0.80% when the tax implemented is a tax on energy instead of a
carbon tax.
A tax on oil also increases the cost of achieving the target. This is especially true
in the case of higher emission reductions; for a 10% reduction in emissions the cost
in terms of GDP is 0.19%, i.e. 1.3 times greater than for a tax on CO2 (0.14%), but for
a 40% reduction the cost is 1.7 times higher (1.07% versus 1.87%). The point made
in Sect. 3 about the positive probability of having to increase reduction targets also
applies here. For the case of the tax on electricity the fall in GDP is significant. For
a 10% reduction in emissions, the cost in terms of GDP is 1.7 times higher (0.24%)
than for a carbon tax, while for a 40% reduction it is 4.3 times higher (4.6%).
The effect of each tax on non-ETS sectors is illustrated in Fig. 5 for each source
in the energy mix. Note that in the CED scenario the level of consumption of each
16 Other studies such as Baranzini et al. (2000) also refer to “the widening gap between the political
discourse and the policy practice” in the EU regarding carbon taxes. Neuhoff (2008) reminds us how in the
1990s the European Commission attempted to implement a European carbon tax but encountered strong
opposition from industry and many Member States. In the case of the USA, Parry and Pizer (2007) clearly
refer to strong political opposition to the setting up of new taxes.
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Fig. 5 Energy consumption (%)
for different scenarios in
non-ETS sectors
source is reduced by an amount proportional to its carbon content while a tax on
energy reduces consumption of all three sources (fossil fuels) by amounts that are
more similar to one another. A tax on oil brings consumption down by a substantial
31% and transfers energy requirements so that other sources, particularly gas, are
less affected. The option that takes us furthest away from the optimum energy mix is
the tax on electricity. This policy alternative would impose a reduction in electricity
consumption of 39.2%. In this case the consumption of coal drops by 59% and the
consumption of gas by 12.8%. This policy measure is the most expensive of all those
analysed, since it fails to fully account for the role that low-carbon technologies can
play in producing electricity.
The important lesson to be learned from these simulations is that is crucial to
select a good policy design for climate policies that affects non-ETS sectors. Choos-
ing the wrong instrument or policy can substantially increase the cost of fighting
global warming. Our simulations also show that although substantial reductions in
CO2 emissions can be achieved in the non-ETS part with the use of a tax on elec-
tricity, mitigation costs may be up to four times the quantity generated with a tax on
CO2. This result is in line with what we have learned from economic theory. The best
tax is one that levies emissions directly as they are the cause of the negative external
effects for the economy. Any deviation from this rule will produce higher mitiga-
tion costs. The quantitative knowledge of how great that deviation can be is highly
illustrative.
5 Concluding remarks
This paper argues that global warming is an important environmental problem with
many economic implications and presents an analysis of the policy context in which
the EU has to design effective instruments to deal with CC. The policy that we study
is a combination of two instruments: the emissions trading scheme that is already in
place in Europe (EU ETS) for sectors included so far in the system, and a CO2 tax
(or other taxes) for the remaining sectors of the economy. The output of this policy is
computed using an AGE model for the Spanish economy.
The first part of the paper analyses four scenarios depending on the criteria used
to share the mitigation effort between ETS and non-ETS sectors (CED, ED, PED
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and POD). The results show that the cost of reducing emissions differs substantially
depending on how the policies for effort sharing are designed. In the cost efficient dis-
tribution of efforts (CED scenario) we calculate that (for a mitigation target of 20%)
ETS sectors should undertake 68% of the effort while the non-ETS sector should
be responsible for the remaining 32% only. The rationale behind this result is that
mitigation is relatively cheaper in ETS sectors than in non-ETS ones due to the car-
bon content of the technologies used in these sectors. This result is a clear empirical
illustration of what economic theory shows: cost-effective distribution implies that
marginal abatement costs are equalised between sectors. Other criteria for distribut-
ing these efforts, e.g. by output (POD), proportionally to the real share of emissions
(PED) or in an egalitarian manner (ED) are not cost-efficient. In fact, the further the
distribution of the mitigation burden between ETS and non-ETS sectors deviates from
the CED scenario, the greater the mitigation costs become.
Although the CED scenario is the ideal criteria for sharing out effort, an egalitarian
rule (ED scenario) can be an “easy” proposal to defend on political grounds, and the
same applies for proportional emission distribution (PED). Finally, the output based-
criteria (POD) may sound less “real” but it can be an alternative when policy makers
decide to take care of some sectors. We presume that the most likely scenario would
be the one based on emission as the cost-effective distribution scenario is probably
more difficult to defend politically. However, we are fairly sure that some sectors will
lobby for an output-based scenario. In any case the comparisons between them are
revealing as they show that a policy design that is not cost-effective generates heavy
losses for the economy as a whole.
The second part of the paper considers the possibility that the “taxable income” may
be changed due to information and political difficulties. That is, that instead of a tax
on CO2 for non-ETS sectors, one of the following three substitute instruments is used:
a tax on energy, a tax on oil or a tax on electricity. This is not unusual in the real world.
In a situation like this, the results show that none of the three options is cost-efficient.
Moreover, the greater the extent to which CO2 emission taxes are replaced by other
related taxes the more the mitigation cost increases. For a 20% mitigation target the tax
on electricity generates the highest cost (close to 0.8% of GDP), followed by the tax on
oil (0.5%) and the tax on energy, which is relatively close to the cost effective scenario
(CED). Note that although it is unlikely that any policy maker would tax electricity to
reduce CO2 emissions, quantifying the potential range of costs that would result from
choosing the “wrong” policy makes the likelihood of its implementation still lower.
Economic incentives are a very powerful tool for reducing pollution but can also be
very distorting if not well designed.
Finally, at least four lines for further research can be suggested. First, other impor-
tant costs such as transaction or enforcement costs could be analysed, although these
are relatively difficult to measure (Krutilla 1999; Heyes 2000). These expenditures
will increase in different proportions depending on the instrument selected. Second,
following Goulder and Parry (2008), other criteria such as equity or political feasibil-
ity could be incorporated into the analysis, highlighting the trade-off that one faces
when having to choose among instruments. Third, it would be interesting to extend
the analysis to incorporate the possibility envisaged in the Kyoto Protocol of buying
emission credits abroad instead of making mitigation efforts domestically (known as
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Project-based Mechanisms17). This extension would probably enable a reduction in
the cost of mitigation. And finally, as policy instruments are rarely implemented with-
out some degree of overlapping, the problems that this might generate in different
policy contexts could be explored. In this case, although some positive interactions
should be expected, it is likely that overall compliance costs will increase, as Del Río
(op cit) shows.
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j, jj 1,…,J Sectors, Intermediate Inputs or Goods
e Coal, Oil, Gas Fossil Fuels
Parameter
Label Description
τ Lj Tax rate on labour, sector j
τ Pj Tax rate on capital, sector j
τCj Tax rate on consumption, good j
τ T∗ Tax rate on specific energy-related goods (energy, oil and electricity)
T Transfers between consumers and government
αe CO2 emission coefficients for fuel and for producers
γe CO2 emission coefficients for fuel and for a representative consumer
σ Elasticity of substitution between inputs
Variables
Nombre Descripción
Y j Output of sector j
Y I Dj, j j Intermediate demand for input jj in sector j
Y Dj Domestic demand for good j
Y T Sj Total supply of good j
Y T Dj Total demand for good j
M j Imports of good j
X j Exports of good j
Variables
Nombre Descripción
K j Demand for capital of sector j
L j Demand for labour of sector j
U Utility of representative consumer
C j Private consumption of good j
G j Public consumption of good j
17 These are foreseen under the Kyoto Protocol together with the emissions trading and are: (1) the Clean
Development Mechanism (CDM) and (2) the Joint Implementation (JI).
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I j Investment in sector j
Pj Equilibrium market price of good j
PK Equilibrium market price of capital
PL Equilibrium market price of wages
PX Equilibrium real exchange rate price of foreign goods
PI Equilibrium market price of investment
PE Equilibrium market price of CO2 permits in ETS sectors
E ET S CO2 emissions in ETS sectors
E P CO2 emissions by producers
EC CO2 emissions by representative consumer
E Total CO2 permits in the ETS sectors
Table A1 Output, consumption and emissions in Spain
Symmetric
input–output
Output Final consumption CO2 emissions
Table (SIOT)
codes
(Me) (%) (Me) (%) (KtCO2) (%)
1 Agriculture & fishing 1,2,3 26,758 (3.8%) 4358 (1.7%) 12,727 (5.5%)
2 Coal mining 4 1542 (0.2%) 40 (0.0%) 315 (0.1%)
3 Crude oil & gas
extraction
5 130 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 165 (0.1%)
4 Extraction of
other minerals
6.7 1782 (0.3%) 18 (0.0%) 364 (0.2%)
5 Food industry 12,13,14,15,16 46,260 (6.5%) 27,438 (11.0%) 5602 (2.4%)
6 Textile industry 17,18,19 12,554 (1.8%) 9684 (3.9%) 1683 (0.7%)
7 Paper industry 20–22 13,858 (2.0%) 3415 (1.4%) 3828 (1.7%)
8 Oil refining industry 8 7563 (1.1%) 2991 (1.2%) 655 (0.3%)
9 Chemical industry 23–24 21,065 (3.0%) 2935 (1.2%) 16,089 (7.0%)
10 Ceramic, cement and
glass industry
36–38 12,736 (1.8%) 2773 (1.1%) 25,870 (11.2%)
11 Metal industry 29–30 22,913 (3.2%) 41 (0.0%) 19,104 (8.3%)
12 Machinery industry 31–35 31,104 (4.4%) 3744 (1.5%) 2494 (1.1%)
13 Other industries 25–28 36,245 (5.1%) 7463 (3.0%) 22,615 (9.8%)
14 Electricity 9 11,335 (1.6%) 4287 (1.7%) 51,698 (22.5%)
15 Natural gas 10 861 (0.1%) 413 (0.2%) 517 (0.2%)
16 Water distribution 11 2457 (0.3%) 1096 (0.4%) 275 (0.1%)
17 Construction 40 100,059 (14.1%) 8186 (3.3%) 2346 (1.0%)
18 Land transport 45.46 21,818 (3.1%) 5394 (2.2%) 11,629 (5.1%)
19 Maritime transport 47 1583 (0.2%) 139 (0.1%) 3166 (1.4%)
20 Air transport 48 3320 (0.5%) 646 (0.3%) 4019 (1.7%)
21 Transport services 49, 50 20,395 (2.9%) 5752 (2.3%) 1035 (0.4%)
22 Commercial services 41–44, 51–56, 58,
62–63, 68–71





91,005 (12.9%) 13,888 (5.5%) 2334 (1.0%)
– Consumers – − – − – 35,678 (15.5%)
Total 707,134 (100%) 250,238 (100%) 229,985 (100%)
1The “Other Industries” according to Spanish CNAE classification groups together the following sectors:
motor vehicles, other transport material, furniture, recycling, other non-metal mineral products
Source INE (2002) and own work
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Table A2 Elasticities of substitution in production, trade and consumption
σY Material inputs and Capital-Labour-Energy 0
σ K L E Capital-Labour and Energy (ETS, Electricity, No ETS) 1, 1.25, 0.75
σ K L Capital and Labour 1
σ E Electricity and Fossil Fuels (ETS, Electricity, No ETS) 0.5, 0.75, 0.25
σ F Coal, Oil and Gas (ETS, Electricity, No ETS) 1, 1.25, 0.75
σ A Domestic and imported goods 3
σ T Domestic goods and exports 2
σC Consumption of energy and non energy goods 0.5
σC E Consumption of energy goods 1
σC B Consumption of non energy goods 1
Source MIT-EPPA (Babiker et al. 2001)
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